How can we secure both essence and control functions in a video over IP environment? What can we glean from the standards developed by the NIST and NSA and how can we apply this to the world of media over IP? This presentation will answer these questions and present an example system.

File Type: pdf
Categories: Security
Presenters : Jed Deame - Nextera
Year : 2019
dlp_document_download : C U R A T E D B Y I P S H OWC A S E T H E AT E R AT N A B – A P R I L 8 -11, 2 019 Military Grade Security for Video over IP Jed Deame, CEO, Nextera Video Agenda • Why Secure Video over IP? • Security Primer • NMOS Security • Customer Case Study 2 Why Secure Video over IP? • High value content may require protection • Keep unauthorized/unintended streams off air • Hackers everywhere • Threats INSIDE the facility 3 3 Classes of Protection 1. Essence Encryption (Military, Mission Critical, etc.) 2. Control Encryption (NMOS) 3. Physical/Environmental Protection 4 Security Primer 1. Cryptographic Security Standards ‒ FIPS 140 -2 ‒ NSA Suite B 2. Cryptographic Algorithms ‒ Encryption Algorithms ‒ Key Establishment ‒ Digital Signatures ‒ Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA) 5 1. Cryptographic Security 6 FIPS 140 -2 Ports & Interfaces Cryptographic Module (e.g.: IP Gateway) Data Input Interface (Essence & Keys) Control Input Interface (Commands) Data Output Interface (Essence & Keys) Status Output Interface Output Port Input Port 7 Security Level 1 – Lowest (Physically protected environments) • Approved Cryptographic Algorithm & Key Management • Standard Compute Platform, unvalidated OS • No Physical Security 8 Security Level 2 • Approved Cryptographic Algorithm & Key Management • Standard Compute Platform • Trusted OS (Tested) ‒ meets Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Level 2 (EAL2) ‒ Referenced Protection Profiles (PP’s) • Tamper Evidence • Identity or Role -based Authentication 9 Security Level 3 • Approved Cryptographic Algorithm & Encrypted Keys • Standard Compute Platform • Trusted OS (Tested) – meets CC EAL3, Referenced PP’s • Tamper Response (zeroizes data) • Identity -only based Authentication • Plaintext Keys/passwords must be entered on separate ports ‒ Physical or Logical Separation with a trusted path 10 Security Level 4 – Highest (Suitable for Physically Unprotected Environments) • Approved Cryptographic Algorithm & Encrypted Keys • Standard Compute Platform • Trusted OS (Tested) – meets CC EAL4, Referenced PP’s • Tamper Response (zeroizes data and plaintext keys ) • Identity -only based Authentication • Plaintext Keys/passwords must be entered on separate ports • Protected for voltage and temperature extremes 11 Crypto/Physical Security (FIPS 140 -2) 12 FIPS 140 -2 cont. 13 NSA Suite B Cryptography 14 Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite (CNSA) 15 Security Primer 1. Cryptographic Security Standards ‒ FIPS 140 -2 ‒ NSA Suite B 2. Cryptographic Algorithms ‒ Encryption Algorithms (AES) ‒ Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA) ‒ Key Establishment (ECDH) ‒ Digital Signatures (DSA) 16 Encryption Algorithms • AES – Advanced Encryption Standard ‒ Symmetric Key Algorithm ‒ 128 bit block size, Key Sizes of 128, 192 and 256 bits • Plaintext -> Ciphertext • Key size specifies # transformation rounds (AES256 = 14 rounds) ‒ CTR (Counter) Mode for low bandwidth traffic ‒ GCM (Galois/Counter Mode) for high bandwidth traffic ‒ Adopted by US Gov’t and used worldwide ‒ NIST FIPS PUB 197 (2001) 17 Brute Force Attacks • AES -128 (HDCP) ‒ Requires 2 128 -1 bit flips. The energy required is ~10 18 joules, which is equivalent to consuming 30 gigawatts of power for one year, which is 262.7 TWh (more than 1% of the world energy production) • AES -256 ‒ Fifty supercomputers that could check a billion billion (10 18 ) AES keys per second (if such a device could ever be made) would, in theory, require about 3×10 51 years to exhaust the 256 -bit key space 18 Secure Hash Algorithms Mapping of arbitrary sized data to fixed size. Must be: 1. Deterministic 2. Quick to compute 3. Infeasible to generate a message from its hash value 4. A small change in message yields a large change in the digest 5. No two messages with the same hash value • Multiple rounds (up to 80) of AND, XOR, NOT, ROT • Published by NIST/FIPS PUB 180/202 (SHA 0/1/2/3 224 -512) 19 SHA Example 20 Key Establishment 1. Public Key Encryption 2. Digital Signatures 3. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 21 Public Key Encryption • Simple & Effective • Subject to man -in -the middle attacks 22 Digital Signatures • A mathematical scheme for verifying the authenticity of digital messages 23 Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) • Gov’t Standard for Digital Signatures (NIST FIPS 186 -4) 1. Specify Hash Function (SHA) 2. Specify Key Length L&N (3072, 256) 3. Choose prime numbers p, q, & g that may be shared 4. Randomly choose a secret private key 5. Compute a Public Key 6. Sign the Key by hashing a random number (PS3) • Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) ‒ OpenSSL 24 How to transfer Encryption Keys? • Paper key list via Trusted Courier • What if we could jointly establish a secret key over an insecure channel? 25 Key Agreement • Two or more parties agree on a key whereby both influence the outcome (perfect forward secrecy) • Diffie -Hellman protocol first 26 Diffie Hellman Key Exchange (Ephemeral) 27 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) • A set of roles, policies, and procedures needed to create, manage, distribute, use, store & revoke digital certificates and manage public - key encryption. 28 NMOS BCP -003 -01 Example Broadcast Controller IP Source Authentication Server IP Destination Auth Request (OAuth) Token (JWT) Essence Flow (2110) Activation (JWT) Activation (JWT) Public Key 29 Core Technologies • PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) • HTTPS (HTTP over TLS) ‒ Connection Security (Encrypted Control Signals) • REST (HTTPS PUT & GET) • JSON (Key -Value Parameter sets) • OAuth 2.0 ‒ Clients Authenticate with Authentication Server • JWT (JSON Web Token) ‒ Client Authorization (issue access tokens) – RSA with SHA -256 30 NMOS Security Goals ‒ Confidentiality - Data passing between client and the APIs is unreadable to third parties. ‒ Identification - The client can check whether the API it is interacting with is owned by a trusted party. ‒ Integrity - It must be clear if data travelling to or from the API been tampered with. ‒ Authentication - The client can check if packets actually came from the API it is interacting with, and vice versa. 31 NMOS Cipher Suite • TLS ECDHE ECDSA WITH AES 128 GCM SHA256 • TLS ECDHE ECDSA WITH AES 256 GCM SHA384 • TLS ECDHE ECDSA WITH AES 128 CBC SHA256 • TLS ECDHE ECDSA WITH AES 256 CBC SHA384 • TLS ECDHE RSA WITH AES 128 GCM SHA256 • TLS ECDHE RSA WITH AES 256 GCM SHA384 • TLS DHE RSA WITH AES 128 GCM SHA256 • TLS DHE RSA WITH AES 256 GCM SHA384 • TLS ECDHE RSA WITH AES 128 CBC SHA256 • TLS ECDHE RSA WITH AES 256 CBC SHA384 • TLS DHE RSA WITH AES 128 CBC SHA256 • TLS DHE RSA WITH AES 256 CBC SHA256 • TLS ECDHE ECDSA WITH AES 128 CCM 8  ======= Minimum Requirement Johnny Quest Decoder Ring: TLS = Transport Layer Security ECDHE = Elliptic Curve Diffie -Hellman Ephemeral KE ECDSA = Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm AES = Advanced Encryption Standard (#bits) GCM = Galois/Counter Mode CBC = Cipher Block Chaining (XOR) SHA = Secure Hash Algorithm (#bits) CCM = Counter with CBC -MAC (Cyber Block Chaining Message Authentication Code) 32 Optionally Encrypted Video/Audio/ USB Secure Control User Authentication Customer Case Study – Secure KVM 33 SYSTEM MANAGER 1 Gb/s Switch Fabric RX GW RX GW RX GW RX GW RX GW TX GW TX GW TX GW TX GW Remote Monitor RX GW TX GW TX GW SERVERS/Workstations SDI Sources Summary • Security is crucial in the internet age ‒ Especially if you have high value content • The US Government has been working on this for years ‒ Leverage work from NIST, NSA, DoD • NMOS Control Security is a great first step ‒ https, Authentication Servers, etc. • For Highest Security, Essence encryption is readily available ‒ Compatible with any transport (2110, 2022, RTP, etc) 34
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